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PEERING INTO PASSIVE ELECTIONEERING: PRESERVING THE
SANCTITY OF OUR POLLING PLACES

REBECCA M. FITZ*
ABSTRACT
A century ago, our legislators took action to condemn voter
intimidation, fraud, and violence occurring on Election Day. The
concept of a neutral zone in polling places was implemented to protect
the democratic values enshrined in our free and fair elections. In
modern times, this policy interest is preserved in state statutes
prohibiting electioneering within polling locations. The majority of
states, including Idaho, restrict voters from introducing political
messages into the voting environment. While active electioneering is
easily identifiable, passive electioneering presents a more subtle and
nuanced issue. In addressing this concern, state electioneering
statutes must balance the considerations of potential infringements
upon the First Amendment and the right to vote. A recent decision by
the Supreme Court disfavors a state statute prohibiting passive
electioneering, marking a shift from past precedent. Thus, a legislative
solution is appropriate to defend the sanctity of our polling places and
the integrity of our electoral process.

* J.D. Candidate, University of Idaho College of Law, 2022. Special thanks to Professor Benjamin
Plener Cover, Professor Stacy Etheredge, and Quindaro Cheatham for their insight, support, and
encouragement. Additionally, I would like to thank the University of Idaho College of Law for offering an
Election Law course and providing students with the opportunity to explore the many facets of election
law during a uniquely topical electoral cycle.
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I. INTRODUCTION
All fifty states have enacted some version of a statute prohibiting
“electioneering” within or near a polling place.1 “Electioneering” occurs when a
person is actively supporting or campaigning for a candidate, political party, or
issue. This paper will focus on electioneering within polling places, particularly
passive electioneering, when a voter wears or displays campaign or political apparel
or paraphernalia at the polling place. As opposed to active electioneering, where a
person assertively approaches voters to hand out literature or makes oral
exhortations—passive electioneering is simply the act of introducing a political
message into the neutral polling place. 2 While the majority of states have clearly
banned active electioneering in polling places, passive electioneering presents an
issue that is more difficult to define and address. Electioneering statutes differ from
state to state, and many do not clearly specify which type of apparel is restricted.3
This causes issues to arise with constitutionality, vagueness, and subjective
enforcement by poll workers and election judge officials. As our rights to speak and
vote are constitutionally cherished—a threat to either can quickly escalate into a
serious infringement of a fundamental right. The policy rationale supporting
electioneering statutes is to preserve a safe, neutral atmosphere that encourages
voter participation while discouraging harassment and intimidation.
The two seminal cases governing electioneering within polling locations are
Burson v. Freeman and Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Manksy.4 In Burson, decided in
1992, the Court upheld a facial challenge to a Tennessee electioneering statute
prohibiting display of campaign materials within 100 feet of a polling place.5
1. Electioneering Prohibitions, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (Apr. 1, 2021),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/electioneering.aspx.
2. Passive Electioneering Law and Legal Definition, USLEGAL,
https://definitions.uslegal.com/p/passive-electioneering/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2022).
3. Electioneering Prohibitions, supra note 1.
4. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992); Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876,
1879 (2018).
5. Burson, 504 U.S. at 211.
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However, more recently in Minnesota Voters Alliance in 2018, the Court held that
a Minnesota statute banning the wearing of political insignia inside the polling place
violated the First Amendment.6 This decision marks a clear shift in the Court’s
precedent and paves the way for more challenges to states’ electioneering statutes
in this context. A solution must be reached to protect the sanctity of our polling
locations and prevent our country from returning to the boisterous and dangerous
election days it is past. This is especially applicable in our current hyper-partisan
and divisive political climate.
This paper details the historical background that prompted the enactment
of electioneering statutes; explains the constitutional implications of the competing
fundamental rights; compares different states’ electioneering statutes and
resulting litigation; and finally, proposes a model state electioneering statute that
addresses frustrations and issues found in current statutes.
II. ANALYZING THE SHIFT TO A PROTECTED POLLING PLACE
Modern elections starkly contrast the unruly voting procedures utilized for
much of this country’s history. Voting during the nineteenth century was a
dangerous undertaking that discouraged many citizens from participating. 7
Comparable to sporting events, onlookers heckled and harassed the opponent’s
voters.8 Usually, a voter’s attire displayed which party he supported which allowed
observers to easily identify how voters aligned with each party.9 Tense verbal
exchanges often escalated into physical violence or property damage, such as a
clash between Whigs and Democrats that resulted in an entire city block burned to
the ground.10 On another tragic Election Day, eighty-nine Americans were killed at
the polls as a result of riots.11 After the closely-contested presidential race of 1888,
legislators introduced ballot reform measures to reduce the widespread violence,
corruption, and voter intimidation that plagued the polls.12
Arguably the most systemic reform measure was the introduction of the
secret ballot. Instead of political parties printing and distributing ballots followed
by voters delivering the completed ballot through a “voting window,”13 voters

6. Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1879.
7. Brief of National Ass’n of Counties et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 6, Minn.
Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876 (2018) (No. 16–1435) [hereinafter NAC Brief].
8. Id. at 8.
9. Id.
10. Jelani Cobb, Our Long, Forgotten History of Election-Related Violence, THE NEW YORKER, (Sept.
6, 2020), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/09/14/our-long-forgotten-history-of-electionrelated-violence.
11. Jill Lepore, Rock, Paper, Scissors: How We Used to Vote, THE NEW YORKER, (Oct. 6, 2008),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2008/10/13/rock-paper-scissors.
12. Daniel J. Moskowitz & Jon C. Rogowski, Democracy Thrives in Secret? Ballot Reform and
Representation in the United States 1 (Dec. 30, 2019) (unpublished manuscript),
https://web.archive.org/web/20210124220653/https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/rogowski/files/mosk
owitz_rogowski.pdf.
13. Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1882 (2018); RICHARD F. BENSEL, THE AMERICAN
BALLOT BOX IN THE MID-NINETEENTH CENTURY 11 (2004); see, e.g., CHESTER H. ROWELL, DIGEST OF CONTESTEDELECTION CASES IN THE FIFTY-FIRST CONGRESS 224 (1891).
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received and completed state-printed ballots at the polling locations.14 This new
method of voting required a “sequestered space where voters could deliberate and
make a decision in . . . privacy.”15 Accordingly, additional reform measures were
needed to provide voters with this private, insulated zone to peacefully cast their
ballots.16 In 1888, the municipal government of Louisville, Kentucky, passed
legislation prohibiting candidates’ agents from persuading, influencing, or
intimidating anyone “in the choice of his candidate, or to attempt doing so.”17 Thus,
polling location electioneering statutes began to take shape.18 By 1900, thirty-four
states had enacted viewpoint-neutral regulations that restricted certain speech
within the polls on Election Day.19 Now, every state and the District of Columbia
have statutes constraining different kinds of speech in this manner.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
A state electioneering statute implicates three different rights. First, a person
exhibiting political speech within a polling zone will likely maintain that censorship
of this speech infringes upon his or her First Amendment right to freedom of
speech. Second, although constitutionally prohibited, it is possible that a voter’s
failure to adhere to an electioneering statute may jeopardize his or her right to vote.
Finally, as electioneering statutes seek to preserve a neutral atmosphere to prevent
influencing of voters, a violation of such a statute may affect other voters’ right to
vote.
A. Electioneering Person’s Right to Speak
The First Amendment is a time-honored, treasured doctrine that is central to
the core beliefs and founding principles of our country. Under the First
Amendment, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.”20 Various scholars have theorized three
main justifications underlying the Free Speech Clause. 21 First, the protection of

14. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 202 (1992); Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1882.
15. Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1883; Jerrold G. Rusk, The Effect of the Australian Ballot
Reform on Split Ticket Voting, 64 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1220, 1221 (1970); see ELDON C. EVANS, A HISTORY OF
THE AUSTRALIAN BALLOT SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES 35 (1917); Act of Apr. 24, 1889, 1889 Minn. Laws ch. 3,
§§ 27–28, 12, 21 (regulating, as part of Minnesota's secret ballot law, the arrangement of voting
compartments inside the polling place and around the ballot boxes).
16. See Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1883.
17. Burson, 504 U.S. at 203.
18. See id.
19. Id. at 214–15 (Scalia, J., concurring).
20. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
21. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Details: Specific Facts and the First Amendment, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 2
(2012).

274

IDAHO LAW REVIEW

VOL. 58

speech aids the advancement of truth via a “marketplace of ideas.” 22 Second, the
ability to freely speak promotes individual autonomy and self-fulfillment.23 Finally,
particularly relevant to election law, freedom of speech is thought to further
principles of self-governance and a participatory democracy.24 Many scholars and
jurists believe that self-governance theory is best and foundational to our country’s
values. Famously expressed by Justice Brandeis, those “who won our
independence” held freedom of speech to be “indispensable” to meaningful
political discussion, and that such public discussion is a civic duty essential to
American government.25
Although written in absolutist language, the Court has repeatedly and
expressly rejected the notion that freedom of speech is an absolute and limitless
right.26 While the government is prohibited from restricting expression because of
its message, ideas, subject-matter, or content—content-based regulations may be
upheld, but only after withstanding the difficult test of strict scrutiny.27 As a
content-based regulation, a statute restricting political apparel would generally
have to be proven necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose. 28
However, since the ban only applies in the specific location of the interior of a
polling place, a “forum-based” approach is applied to the challenged statute.29
A polling place qualifies as a “nonpublic forum” or a government space that
“is not by tradition or designation a forum for public communication.”30 As such,
the government is permitted to reserve such a forum for its intended purposes,
communicative or otherwise, provided that the regulation on speech is reasonable
and not an effort to suppress speech merely because government officials hold
opposing viewpoints.31 The government is not required to freely grant access to a
nonpublic forum without regard to potential “disruption that might be caused by
the speaker’s activities.”32 Precedent has long established that the government may
impose certain content-based restrictions on speech in nonpublic forums, including
restrictions on political advocacy.33 Therefore, an electioneering statute restricting
political apparel within a polling place will be upheld as long as it is reasonable in

22. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1180 (Rachel E. Barkow et al. eds., 6th ed. 2020).
23. See Bhagwat, supra note 21, at 32; Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First
Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 879 (1963); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 22, at 1183.
24. Bhagwat, supra note 21, at 2; Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20–21 (1971).
25. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), overruled by
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (discussing civic participation in politics).
26. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015); Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433
(2015).
27. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 22, at 1186.
28. Id.; Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
29. Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1885 (2018).
30. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Loc. Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
31. Id.
32. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 799–800 (1985).
33. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 831–33 (1976); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298,
303–04 (1974).
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light of the purpose served by the forum and is not an effort to suppress an
opposing viewpoint.34
Two decisions help to illustrate the concepts of reasonability and government
purpose regarding electioneering in the First Amendment context. In Burson v.
Freeman, the Court found a Tennessee law imposing a campaign-free zone around
a polling place to be constitutional.35 Citing historical issues with fraud, voter
intimidation, and disorder, the plurality held that the law was necessary to achieve
the government’s purpose of ensuring free and fair elections.36 In his concurrence,
Justice Scalia asserted that a “reasonableness” standard of review was more
appropriate; however, he still maintained that the law was reasonable using the
plurality’s analysis.37 More recently in Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky, the
Court struck down a statute prohibiting political apparel within a polling place. 38
Drawing a distinction between the “active-campaigning” analyzed in Burson,
Minnesota Voters Alliance evaluated a scenario of “passive-campaigning.”39 The
Court expressed disfavor about the vagueness of a statute that restricted “political”
apparel without further defining the broadly applicable term “political.” 40 The
statute was found to be unreasonable because it required an election judge to
enforce its vague terms and interpret his or her view of whatever “political”
means.41 A reasonable statute “must be able to articulate some sensible basis for
distinguishing what may come in from what must stay out.” 42 Thus, the vagueness
of the statute impermissibly infringed upon the Minnesota voters’ right to speak. 43
Read in conjunction, these decisions guide our current understanding of
permissible electioneering laws and the related First Amendment considerations.
B. Electioneering Person’s Right to Vote
The right to vote is illustrated in various constitutional amendments and has
been repeatedly recognized as a fundamental right protected under the Equal
Protection Clause.44 The Court has noted that, “[n]o right is more precious in a free
country than that of having a voice in the election of those who the laws under
which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory
if the right to vote is undermined.”45 In sum, voting is a “fundamental political right”
because it is “preservative of all rights.”46 Election laws that regulate a voter’s

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 799–800; Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1880.
Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 195 (1992).
Id. at 206.
Id. at 214 (Scalia, J., concurring) (preferring a reasonableness standard).
Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1892.
Id. at 1887.
Id. at 1888.
Id. at 1890.
Id. at 1888.
Id. at 1891–92.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 22, at 1053.
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964).
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
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experience or restrict expression at the polls directly impact a voter’s participation
in our democratic system.47 Infringements upon the protected right to vote are
usually evaluated under a strict scrutiny standard.48 Generally, the government has
the burden to prove that the contested election statute is necessary to achieve a
compelling government interest.49
However, despite being recognized as a fundamental right, not every state
election law that places a burden on the right to vote is subject to strict scrutiny. 50
This reasoning stems from the fact that all election laws, including regulations of
the voting process itself, will “invariably impose some burden upon individual
voters.”51 In Anderson v. Celebrezze, the Court held that a challenge to state
election law must weigh “the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the
rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks
to vindicate” against the “precise interests” provided by the government as
justifications for the burden imposed by its law.52 Under this test, the more heavily
the challenged regulation burdens the First Amendment, the more likely strict
scrutiny will be used.53 In a narrower scope, when the challenged regulation
imposes only “reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions” upon the First
Amendment rights of voters, the government’s “important regulatory interests”
sufficiently justify the regulations.54
It is important to distinguish that the Anderson test approaches electioneering
statutes from a “right to vote” standpoint, whereas Burson and Minnesota Voters
Alliance address similar statutes from a First Amendment perspective. As
electioneering statutes must reconcile the right to engage in political discourse with
the right to vote,55 both analyses are necessary when evaluating constitutionality.
Anderson adds another constitutional layer to the reasonableness requirement
held in Minnesota Voters Alliance—preserving the neutrality of the polling place
must equate to an “important regulatory interest” to justify the infringement upon
the Free Speech Clause.56 Balancing these considerations also helps reveal potential
tensions and issues that may arise. It has been argued that electioneering statutes
prohibiting political expression indirectly threaten the speaker’s right to vote
through promotion of impermissible enforcement.57 In contrast, it can also be
argued that these restrictions protect the speaker’s right to vote.

47. Joshua A. Douglas, Is the Right to Vote Really Fundamental?, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 143
(2008).
48. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992); Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663, 670 (1966).
49. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 22, at 1053–54.
50. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433–34 (1992).
51. Id. at 433.
52. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983) (finding that a state’s filing deadline for
independent candidates was unconstitutional).
53. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (finding that a state’s ban on write-in voting does not violate First
Amendment rights of free expression).
54. Id.
55. Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1892 (2018) (citing Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S.
191, 198 (1992)).
56. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788.
57. See Minn. Majority v. Mansky, 708 F.3d 1051 (8th Cir. 2013).
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Electioneering statutes are enforced by a vast amount of poll workers and
election judges across thousands of counties and precincts. A lack of clear policy
and procedure for electioneering violations leads to varying, discretionary
enforcement of the statutes. Evidenced in Minnesota Majority v. Mansky, multiple
voters wore political buttons and party-affiliated t-shirts to different polling
places.58 While some election judges allowed these specified voters to cast their
ballots without requesting removal, other electioneering voters faced significant
hurdles.59 One man was asked to remove his political apparel, then denied his right
to vote on two occasions and for a total of five hours before election judges allowed
him to cast his ballot.60 Another man was interrupted as he was voting and asked
to remove or cover his t-shirt accompanied by a warning of prosecution.61 Although
no language in the Minnesota electioneering statute suggested that denying a
person their right to vote was the appropriate remedy for a violation, the poll
workers cited to the statute when incorrectly interfering with the voters’ rights. 62
This case exemplifies how such a statute may infringe upon an electioneering
person’s right to vote, even though the statute does not allow for such an
infringement. This poll worker’s unlawful denial of the right to vote highlights the
need for express language in the electioneering statute condemning this action.
True to the purpose of electioneering statutes, such restrictions also serve to
protect an electioneering person’s right to vote. Prohibiting political expression at
the polling places can be viewed as an extension of the secret ballot. A voter’s
neutral attire does not provide the poll workers nor the surrounding voters with
any indication of how they may vote. Whereas a voter wearing political attire clearly
in support of a candidate or issue effectively informs observers how they are going
to fill out their ballot; therefore, theoretically threatening his or her secret ballot.
In the most recent presidential election, issues arose in Maricopa County, Arizona,
where supporters of President Donald Trump claimed that poll workers provided
them with Sharpie pens to fill out their ballot and that the ballot counting machines
were unable to scan votes tallied by Sharpie. 63 Quickly named, the conspiracy of
“Sharpiegate” rapidly spread over social media platforms and was further fueled by
high-profile Republican leaders supporting the unfounded claims of voter fraud. 64
While some narratives claimed that Sharpies were provided at precincts with a large
amount of historically Republican voters, other stories involved allegations that
58. Id. at 1055.
59. Id.
60. Minn. Majority v. Mansky, 789 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1119 (D. Minn. 2011), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 708 F.3d 1051 (8th Cir. 2013).
61. Id.
62. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 211B.11 (West 2022).
63. John D’Anna & Richard Ruelas, ‘Sharpiegate’ Has Not Halted Ballot Counting in Arizona, but
the Debunked Theory Persists, AZCENTRAL (Nov. 6, 2020, 8:57 PM),
https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/elections/2020/11/05/sharpiegate-hasnt-haltedarizona-count-but-theory-persists/6180778002/.
64. Katie Shepherd & Hannah Knowles, Driven by Unfounded ‘SharpieGate’ Rumor, Pro-Trump
Protesters Mass Outside Arizona Vote-Counting Centers, WASH. POST (Nov. 5, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/11/05/arizona-election-protest-votes.
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Sharpies were specifically provided to voters wearing “Make American Great Again”
hats and other political apparel meant to support President Trump.65 Notably,
Arizona is one of few states that permit voters to wear clothing with a political
message inside the polling zone.66
Unsurprisingly, “Sharpiegate” stirred a significant amount of controversy as
the conspiracy went viral. Lawsuits were filed and the Arizona Attorney General’s
office wrote an investigatory letter to the Maricopa County Elections Department. 67
Although later debunked as a falsity,68 “Sharpiegate” evidences a scenario in which
political expression at the polls would hypothetically allow poll workers to
fraudulently tamper with votes counting towards a specific candidate or issue.
Requiring neutrality in the polling places thwarts an ill-intentioned poll worker and
removes this form of malfeasance from the realm of possibilities. A voter exhibiting
no indication of how he or she may vote would be immune to this manner of
election fraud. Thus, electioneering statutes also operate to protect the voting
rights of the electioneering person in the context of fraud.
C. Other Voters’ Rights to Vote
Similar to the electioneering person’s right to vote, the surrounding voters
present at the precinct also hold this right. It follows that any infringement upon
another voter’s right to vote is likely to be disfavored by a court. The historical
framework discussed previously provides guiding policy reasons for the enactment
of electioneering statutes prohibiting partisan or political speech within the polling
locations.69 Reflecting the success of these statutes, our modern elections are
conducted in a more orderly fashion that discourages disruption and intimidation. 70
Nonetheless, confrontations and other Election Day disorderly conduct continue to
be an issue at our polling places.71 Evaluating an observing person’s right to vote,
this presents a series of questions: (1) Does passive electioneering contribute to or
cause voter intimidation or disruption within the polling place to the extent that it
infringes upon a voter’s right to vote?; (2) Is there a constitutionally recognized right
to vote in a neutral, peaceful polling location?; and (3) If not, should there be?
65. @AZWomenForTrump, TWITTER (Nov. 5, 2020, 3:28 PM),
https://twitter.com/AZWomenForTrump/status/1324478800952877056 (“I know two people who[se]
vote was marked invalid. They were in line with all Trump supporters and were all given [S]harpies”);
Jaea Geep (@JaeaGeep), TWITTER (Nov. 4, 2020, 11:06 AM),
https://twitter.com/JaeaGeep/status/1324050341407719424; D’Anna & Ruelas, supra note 63.
66. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-515(F) (2022) (prohibiting only election officials from wearing
clothing with a political message inside a polling zone).
67. Letter from Michael Catlett, Deputy Solicitor General, Office of the Arizona Attorney
General, to Scott Jarrett, Director of Elections Day and Emergency Voting, Maricopa County Elections
Department (Nov. 4, 2020), https://www.azag.gov/sites/default/files/202011/LT%20Jarrett%20re%20Use%20of%20Sharpie%20Markers_Redacted.pdf.
68. Rachel Leingang & McKenzie Sadeghi, Fact Check: Arizona Election Departments Confirm
Sharpies Can Be Used on Ballots, USA TODAY (Nov. 5, 2020, 10:58 AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/factcheck/2020/11/04/fact-check-sharpiegate-controversyarizona-false-claim/6164820002/.
69. See supra Part II.
70. NAC Brief, supra note 7, at 8.
71. Alan Neuhauser, Voter Intimidation Complaints Surge, U.S. NEWS (Nov. 8, 2016, 3:35 PM),
https://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2016-11-08/voter-intimidation-complaints-surge.
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Examining whether a voter’s passive electioneering rises to the level of an
infringement upon another observing voter’s right to vote is a difficult inquiry. Of
course, if a large group of voters enters the polling place with apparel displaying
political or campaign messages, and this causes another voter to feel intimidated
or unwelcome to the point of leaving the polling place and not casting his or her
vote— this is definitely a scenario that implicates a potential infringement upon the
observing voter’s right. However, imagine a similar scenario where the observing
voter does not leave the polling place, but rather feels uncomfortable and hurriedly
completes his or her ballot in a manner that is less attentive absent the distraction.
Further, what if the level of discomfort discouraged the observing voter from
participating in future elections? Considering these hypothetical situations, the
level of interference with the observing voter’s right to vote and the possible
infringement of that right is challenging to ascertain. Reported by the Election
Crimes Branch of the Justice Department, concrete evidence of intimidation is often
lacking because it is “amorphous and largely subjective in nature.”72
A recent occurrence may assist in determining the effect of partisan political
messaging on voters attempting to cast their ballots. On October 11, 2020, Trump
supporters gathered outside a county government center in Nevada City, California,
while early voting was being conducted both inside and outside the building. 73 This
particular polling site happened to be one of the most popular drive-up ballot boxes
in the county.74 The supporters donned Trump merchandise while playing music
and cheering through a megaphone.75 As the relevant California statute prohibits
electioneering within 100 feet of polling locations, this group was in violation of this
law.76 When interviewed by the Washington Post, one election official confirmed
that citizens casting their ballots reported that “they did not feel comfortable,” and
some had issues accessing the ballot drop box because of the demonstration.77 A
slightly different message was provided by the county’s director of elections who
maintained that she was not aware of any voter intimidation issues surrounding
this incident.78 These conflicting statements from election officials from the same
office speak to the difficulties election administration officials face in tangibly
assessing levels of voter intimidation.
Although this scenario involves other contributing factors such as loitering and
inaccessibility, the important takeaway is that an overt display of partisan support
within a polling location can cause a voter to feel discomfort. While concrete
statistical evidence is lacking on this matter, it can be inferred that discomfort does

72. ELECTION CRIMES BRANCH, U. S. DEP’T OF JUST., FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF ELECTION CRIMES 50 (Richard
C. Pilger ed., 8th ed. 2017), https://www.justice.gov/criminal/file/1029066/download#page=61.
73. Joshua Partlow, Shouting Matches, Partisan Rallies, Guns at Polling Places: Tensions High at
Early-Voting Sites, WASH. POST (Oct. 21, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/voterintimidation-allegations/2020/10/20/6722d0ae-123e-11eb-82af-864652063d61_story.html.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 319.5 (West 2022).
77. Partlow, supra note 73.
78. Id.
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not encourage a person to exercise his or her right to vote. At the point that a
person makes the choice to forgo this right due to electioneering, it is arguable that
an infringement has occurred. It is possible that such an infringement upon one’s
right to vote may provide said person with an action of legal recourse. 79 Section
11(b) of the Voting Rights Act states that “no person, whether acting under color of
law or otherwise, shall intimidate, threaten, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate,
threaten, or coerce any person for voting or attempting to vote.” 80 However, this
section is seldom used in litigation and there are very few cases exploring its
scope.81 Furthermore, such a legal fix would not be able to remedy the voter’s lost
opportunity to vote.
In addition to potentially causing an infringement upon an observing voter’s
fundamental right, passive electioneering may also contribute to disruption within
the polling place. A disruption such as a confrontation, harassment, or physical
violence may also frustrate the surrounding voters’ right to vote.82 In a 2008 study
of relatively recent Wisconsin elections, the data suggested that an average of thirty
disruptions, such as fighting and voter intimidation, occur during each election. 83 In
a “heightened political environment” where “tensions are running rampant,”
election supervisors must protect all voters’ rights to cast their ballots.84
In 2008, two Pennsylvania county election officials sued their state election
officials after the state issued an advisory memorandum allowing voters to wear
political and campaign-related attire to the polls.85 One of the lawsuit’s claims
alleged that permitting voters to exhibit partisan messages would “affect the health
and safety of voters.”86 As has been demonstrated, the wearing of political apparel
within the polling location exacerbates the potential for the above-mentioned
problems to arise.87 Thus, neutrality within a polling place is favored to minimize
these incidents. However, does the protection of such neutrality rise to the level of
a constitutionally safeguarded aspect of a voter’s right to vote?
Currently, there is no precedent on this theory. Although many state
electioneering statutes create a buffer zone insulating the polling locations,88 there
is no recognized right to cast one’s vote in a zone of neutrality. As discussed,
legislative history and intent behind implementation of polling place electioneering
statutes support the preservation of an “island of calm in which voters can

79. Ben Cady & Tom Glazer, Voters Strike Back: Litigating Against Modern Voter Intimidation,
39 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 173, 179 (2015) (arguing that people who have experienced voter
intimidation may have a legal claim through § 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act).
80. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 11(b), 52 U.S.C. § 10307(b).
81. Cady & Glazer, supra note 79, at 227 (discussing cases litigated under § 11(b)).
82. NAC Brief, supra note 7, at 9.
83. NAC Brief, supra note 7, at 10.
84. Mary Ellen Klas & Ana Ceballos, New Tension at the Polls as Supporters Get Aggressive and
Officials Call in Police, MIAMI HERALD, https://www.miamiherald.com/news/politics-government/statepolitics/article246576963.html (Oct. 30, 2020, 11:04 AM).
85. Kraft v. Harhut, et al., ACLU PA., https://www.aclupa.org/en/cases/kraft-v-harhut-et-al (last
visited Mar. 9, 2022).
86. Id.
87. NAC Brief, supra note 7, at 8.
88. E.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 319.5 (West 2022) (prohibiting electioneering within 100 feet of polling
locations).
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peacefully contemplate their choices.”89 Minnesota Voters Alliance marked a clear
departure from previous cases supporting electioneering statutes and, given the
current ideological makeup of the Court, it would not be surprising if future
decisions viewed similar electioneering statutes unfavorably. If the pendulum of
American history swings back to unruly polling places, perhaps we may see a second
reform movement aimed at constitutionally securing a voter’s right to peacefully
complete a ballot in a neutral-zone, free from partisan messaging. However, this
solution would theoretically require the momentum from the opposing swing.
IV. COMPARING STATES’ DIFFERING APPROACHES
In striking down the Minnesota statute that prohibited voters from wearing
“political” badges, buttons, or other insignia,90 the Court emphasized its disapproval
of the “unmoored use” of the word “political.” 91 Without a narrower definition,
banning all “political” attire is not only vague but also significantly overinclusive of
apparel that would be unlikely to rise to the level of electioneering. Currently,
fifteen states prohibit campaign apparel, buttons, and stickers, and thirty-seven
states prohibit campaign materials, signs, banners, and literature. 92 By comparing
different states’ electioneering statutes and incidents stemming from the
implementation thereof, one can appreciate the difficulties of drafting a clear
electioneering statute that effectively balances free speech and voting
considerations.
In Idaho, section 18-2318 of the state code addresses electioneering at the
polls with two relevant provisions.93 First, under section 18-2318(1)(a), “no person
may . . . [d]o any electioneering” within 100 feet of a polling place. 94 No definition
of electioneering is found in the Idaho Code.95 Following in section 18-2318(1)(d),
persons are also prohibited from “engag[ing] in any practice which interferes with
the freedom of voters to exercise their franchise or disrupts the administration of
the polling place.”96 No person has ever been prosecuted under this statute and it
has also never been litigated.97 However, interestingly enough, in 2006, the
legislature amended section 18-2318 by increasing the maximum penalty amount
from $100 to $1,000.98 With no statute violations and no explained accompanying
reasons for increasing the fine, the legislative motive is slightly confusing—
especially as the term “electioneering” has no clear definition.
89. Brief of Respondents at 43, Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876 (2018) (No. 16-1435).
90. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 211B.11(1) (West 2022), declared unconstitutional by Minn. Voters All. v.
Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876 (2018).
91. Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1880 (2018).
92. Electioneering Prohibitions, supra note 1.
93. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-2318 (West 2022).
94. Id. § 18-2318(1)(a).
95. Id. § 18-2318; cf. id. § 67-6602(7) (defining only “electioneering communication”).
96. Id. § 18-2318(1)(d).
97. Westlaw search under Notes of Decision and History produced no results.
98. Act of July 1, 2006, ch. 71, sec. 5, § 18-2318(3), 2006 Idaho Sess. Laws 216, 218 (codified as
amended at IDAHO CODE § 18-2318(3)).
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On October 27, 2020, the Idaho Attorney General, Lawrence Wasden,
released an opinion clarifying guidance regarding passive electioneering through
expressive attire.99 Avoiding definite terms, the opinion states that section 18-2318
“most likely” prohibits active campaigning in polling places, as opposed to passive
campaigning.100 Regarding apparel, the opinion provided the following:
If a voter appears at the polls wearing a shirt or button with electionrelated slogans, graphics, or the like simply goes about their business
to vote without interfering with anyone else, making a statement, or
any other active conduct related to their message, this office
recommends that they be allowed to vote without any discussion of the
issue.101
Nevertheless, the day after this release was made, a man participating in early
voting was asked to remove his baseball hat supporting President Trump. 102 The
governing county’s election office cited section 18-2318(1)(d) when explaining its
poll worker’s request.103 Upon learning of the freshly released Attorney General
opinion, the county removed signs around the polling place that contained
language instructing voters that clothing and accessories related to a candidate
were not allowed.104 A polling place actively changing its procedures in the midst of
an election cycle speaks to the fluid and evolving nature of this debated issue.
Although Attorney General Wasden attempted to provide clarity on this issue,
his guidance can also be construed as further misleading Idaho voters. An
interpretation of the statute from one of Idaho’s highest legal authorities that
active campaigning is “most likely” prohibited suggests that the prohibition is not
absolute and effectively opens the door for a statutory challenge on vagueness. As
shown in other state regulations, it is extremely difficult to enumerate acceptable
voting practices without creating more confusion. For example, Attorney General
Wasden explicitly stated that political shirts and buttons are allowed, 105 but what
about a campaign baseball hat? Additionally, this opinion does not consider the
idea that even a voter “go[ing] about their business” while wearing political attire
could itself interfere with another voter’s right to vote through intimidation,
discomfort, or doubt in the neutrality of the election process. 106 The Attorney
General’s opinion evidences a need for more thorough guidance and, perhaps,
renewed reflection on the legislative drafting of section 18-2318.

99. Associated Press, County Ban on Political Apparel at Polls Incorrect, U.S. NEWS (Oct. 28, 2020,
1:24 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/idaho/articles/2020-10-28/idaho-ag-countyban-on-political-apparel-at-polls-incorrect.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Taylor Viydo, Post Falls Man Says He Was Asked to Remove Hat Supporting President Trump
at the Polls, KTVB7 (Oct. 29, 2020, 8:34 PM), https://www.ktvb.com/article/news/politics/post-fallsman-asked-to-remove-trump-hat-polls/293-a2fea26f-1a9f-444e-bb7c-688479c1e636.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Associated Press, supra note 99.
106. Associated Press, supra note 99.
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Along the same lines, Pennsylvania election law forbids a person from
electioneering or soliciting votes within polling places but also fails to further define
the term “electioneer”.107 In 2008, two voters in a Pennsylvania primary election
were denied entry to the polling place after sporting t-shirts that endorsed specific
candidates.108 Representing these voters, the ACLU wrote the Pennsylvania
Secretary of State a letter requesting that clarification be provided to election
officials.109 As a result, the Commissioner of the Pennsylvania Department of State’s
Bureau of Commissions, Elections and Legislation sent a memorandum to all county
elections boards providing that voters who “take no additional action to attempt to
influence other voters in the polling place” rather than “wearing of clothing or
buttons” supporting a political party or candidate are not in violation of the state’s
electioneering statute.110 When a few county officials challenged the
Commissioner’s memorandum, the trial court ruled that state officials had the right
to provide such guidance, but it declined to decide whether political apparel rose
to the level of electioneering.111 Although the court expressed concern about the
state official’s guidance, it maintained that “a court cannot mandate common sense
or good taste.”112 As this decision was released just days before the general
election, election officials entered Election Day with a frustratingly ambiguous
interpretation of the statute.113
In theory, an electioneering statute may seem plausible. However, in practice,
enforcing an electioneering statute may present unforeseen challenges that
essentially defeat the purpose of the statute. For example, consider a polling place
that is so overwhelmed with voters that the line extends beyond the limits of the
protected neutral sphere. In 2004, the Sixth Circuit declared a Kentucky state law
that restricted electioneering within 500 feet of polling places as unconstitutionally
overbroad in violation of the First Amendment. 114 Kentucky’s current and revised
anti-electioneering statute bars campaigning within a 100-foot distance.115 With
social distancing and long line concerns as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, the
Kentucky Secretary of State sought clarification from the Kentucky Attorney
General on where the restricted zone would begin. 116 In response, the Kentucky
Attorney General’s Office provided guidance that “the 100 feet would be measured

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

25 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. § 3060(c) (West 2022).
Kraft v. Harhut, et al., supra note 85.
Kraft v. Harhut, et al., supra note 85.
Kraft v. Harhut, et al., supra note 85.
Leo Strupczeski, Judge Dodges Ban on Political T-Shirts, but Rejects GOP Bid for ACORN List,
LAW.COM
(Nov.
03,
2008,
12:00
AM),
https://www.law.com/almID/1202425715113/?slreturn=20201101202720.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Anderson v. Spear, 356 F.3d 651, 656–66 (6th Cir. 2004).
115. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 117.235 (West 2022).
116. Josh James, Kentucky Forbids Electioneering 100 Feet From the Polls. But What if Lines Are
Longer?, WUKY (Nov. 2, 2020), https://www.wuky.org/post/kentucky-forbids-electioneering-100-feetpolls-what-if-lines-are-longer#stream/0.
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from the front of the polling location.”117 Governor Andy Beshear expressed
concern about this opinion, stating that “people who show up in line to vote should
not have anybody trying to either get their vote, either in a positive or a negative
way.”118 This scenario presented in Kentucky again stresses the ambiguities in real
world applications of anti-electioneering statutes.
Anticipating electioneering issues in the 2020 Presidential Election, California
election officials proactively released a memorandum explaining which expressive
materials would potentially constitute electioneering.119 Section 319.5 of the
California Elections Code defines “electioneering” as “the visible display or audible
dissemination of information that advocated for or against any candidate or
measure on the ballot within 100 feet of a polling place.” 120 Per the memorandum
issued on September 28, 2020, Jana M. Lean, Chief of the Elections Division,
instructed all county clerks and registrars of voters with a non-inclusive list of
prohibited materials within polling locations.121 The prohibited materials
encompass displays of a candidate’s name, likeness, or logo or a ballot measure’s
number, title, subject, or logo.122 Following the list is a statement of permitted
expressions:
It should be noted that a campaign slogan or a political movement
slogan (or the initials representing the campaign or political movement)
does not constitute electioneering under the legal definition of
electioneering as stated above. Accordingly, the display of slogans on
clothing, face coverings, and/or buttons is not prohibited. Examples of
campaign slogans or political movement slogans include but are not
limited to: Make America Great Again (MAGA), Black Lives Matter
(BLM), Keep America Great (KAG), Vote for Science, and Build Back
Better.123
This interpretation of the statute allowed California voters to bring political
expression into the polling locations so long as it did not explicitly display the
candidate or measure.124 However, arguably, a widely known slogan can be seen as
synonymous with endorsing a specific candidate. The infamous red baseball cap
emblazoned “Make America Great Again” entered popular culture as Donald
Trump’s political career gained momentum. If a campaign slogan so clearly supports
a candidate, how can it meaningfully be separated from an item that plainly states
the candidate’s name or likeness? At this point, does the statute even accomplish
its aim?

117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Memorandum from Jana M. Lean, Chief, Elections Div., to All Cnty. Clerks/Registrars of
Voters (Sept. 28, 2020), https://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/ccrov/pdf/2020/september/20222jl.pdf.
120. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 319.5 (West 2022).
121. Memorandum from Jana M. Lean, Chief, Elections Div., to All Cnty. Clerks/Registrars of
Voters (Sept. 28, 2020), https://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/ccrov/pdf/2020/september/20222jl.pdf.
122. Id.
123. Id. (emphasis added).
124. Id.
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V. IMPLEMENTING A HEIGHTENED REASONABLE PERSON STANDARD
The variety of electioneering statutes among the states paired with their
problematic vagueness presents issues of tension in polling locations, subjective
enforcement based on partisanship, and plain avoidance of enforcement. In
addition, there is no federal law or regulation that provides guidance. This
contention is ripe for a solution.
The concept of “reasonability” is widely accepted and found in numerous
governing legal doctrines. A fundamental tort principle ascertains negligence based
on what a reasonable person might do under similar circumstances. 125 Some
criminal statutes require a reasonable explanation of belief to prove culpability or
to excuse the offense.126 When interpreting contract disputes, courts will determine
“what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have thought the
disputed [contract’s] language meant.”127 In addition, certain evidentiary standards
require proof “beyond a reasonable doubt.”128 The theory of reasonableness is
undoubtedly enshrined in modern jurisprudence.
States’ electioneering statutes attempt to define which expression affects the
neutrality of the polling place, while simultaneously balancing First Amendment
and voting rights. In considering the previously discussed constitutional implication,
drafting these statutes is no simple feat. As illustrated through analyzing different
states’ approaches, the statutes tend to be either overinclusive, underinclusive, or
muddied by state officials’ interpretations. My proposal seeks to address these
issues by incorporating four key components: (1) a “no reasonable person”
standard; (2) statutory language protecting the electioneering person’s right to
vote; (3) a citation issued by a poll worker; and (4) an adjudication after Election
Day, in which there is an option to elect for a jury to hear the proceeding.
Although well-suited for other seemingly imprecise doctrines, a plain
reasonable person standard allows greater deference to poll workers enforcing the
statute. Such a standard may result in a poll worker imposing his or her bias or
viewpoint on the situation. As discussed, it is impermissible for a government actor
to place a viewpoint restriction on speech.129 For example, a reasonable person
standard may create a situation where a poll worker, noticing a “Black Lives Matter”
pin on a voter, makes a decision that this pin was reasonably associated with a
democrat-candidate’s campaign. Thus, resulting in a voter’s citation. Although
different political movements may align ideologically with either party, it is a
difficult inquiry to precisely define the point where showing support for a

125. 57B AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 825, Westlaw (database updated Feb. 2022).
126. Reasonable person language is used in manslaughter and the necessity defense. See
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 (AM. L. INST. 1962) (manslaughter definition requires a reasonable
explanation or excuse); Nelson v. State, 597 P.2d 977, 979 (Alaska 1979) (necessity defense available if
a person acted in the reasonable belief that an emergency existed).
127. Intercounty Constr. Corp. v. District of Columbia, 443 A.2d 29, 32 (D.C. 1982).
128. 4 CHRISTINE P. COSTANTAKOS, NEBRASKA JUVENILE COURT LAW AND PRACTICE § 13:13 (2021-2022
ed. 2021).
129. See Perry Educ. Ass’n. v. Perry Loc. Educators’ Ass’n., 460 U.S. 37, 55 (1983).
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movement is synonymous with endorsing a candidate or issue on the ballot.
However, by rephrasing the reasonable person standard conversely, this narrows
the scope of the application. If the standard required that “no reasonable person”
could deny that the voter’s speech was meant to support a candidate or ballot
initiative, this greatly reduces the potential for a subjective application of
viewpoint. Using the same example, because a reasonable person could deny that
the “Black Lives Matter” pin was not meant to support a democrat-candidate, this
would not rise to the level of passive electioneering within the polling place.
The second component of this proposed statute is that it must contain express
language that preserves the electioneering person’s right to vote. An example of
this would be: “If a citizen violates this statute, he or she must first be afforded his
or her right to vote before issuance of a citation. A violation of this statute results
in a misdemeanor citation only. Election administration officials may not interfere
with this right.” Another potential addition could be assigning criminal liability to
poll workers that knowingly chose to deny a person the right to vote. This
component seeks to eliminate the actions of an uninformed or intentionally
wrongful poll worker that seriously infringe upon the voter’s fundamental right. By
explicitly stating the exact procedures a poll worker is to take, this gives clear
guidance that can be instructed in poll worker training.
The final components outline the penalty and judicial proceeding stemming
from a violation of this proposed statute. Under this statute, if a poll worker deems
a person to be passively electioneering within the polling place, after voting, the
person is issued a citation specifying a date for a court appearance. No fine is
imposed in the interim. At the judicial proceeding, the person may elect to have a
jury determine the outcome of his or her proceeding. This ensures that the “no
reasonable person” standard is implemented by a group of the electioneering
person’s community members and adds an additional safeguard to the potential
subjective enforcement of a poll worker or a judge’s sole determination.
These components attempt to balance the critical rights at play while still
honoring and upholding the neutrality of the polling place. Implementation of such
a statute would require each individual state legislature to adopt and sign it into
law. While such an idea may seem far-fetched and slightly impossible with the
current state of affairs, if the Court returns another opinion rejecting the
constitutionality of a polling place electioneering statute—states desiring to
preserve neutral polling places will be newly motivated to take creative legislative
steps to solve this issue.
VI. CONCLUSION
In sum, passive electioneering introduces subtle political campaigning into our
polling locations. As demonstrated by the examples provided, state statutes
present various vagueness and enforceability issues. This current shift in the Court’s
rhetoric is concerning and may call for swift legislative action from either Congress
or the states. The key components of my proposed electioneering statute address
the competing constitutional interests of freedom of speech and the right to vote,
while shielding our voting process from partisan messaging. To preserve the time-
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honored and sacred tradition of neutrality in our polling places and to restrict such
inappropriate political interference, a solution is necessary.

